Книга - The problem of demarcation in modern science

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The problem ofdemarcation inmodernscience
Sergey Pavlov

Pavel Minakov

Vadim Shmal


Vadim Shmal Ph. D. Associate ProfessorRUSSIAN UNIVERSITY OF TRANSPORT (MIIT)Pavel Minakov Ph. D. Associate ProfessorRUSSIAN UNIVERSITY OF TRANSPORT (MIIT)Sergey Pavlov MasterPLEKHANOV RUSSIAN UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS





The problem ofdemarcation inmodernscience



Vadim Shmal

Pavel Minakov

Sergey Pavlov



Vadim Shmal,2021

Pavel Minakov,2021

Sergey Pavlov,2021



ISBN978-5-0055-3245-9

Created with Ridero smart publishing system




Demarcation issues


Inphilosophy ofscience and epistemology, the problem ofdemarcation is the problem ofestablishing the boundary between science and philosophy ofscience.

Philosophers often try toshow the boundary between science and philosophy ofscience bydelineating the boundaries between disciplines or dividing fundamental assumptions about reality, such as time and space, or objectivity and subjectivity, into different theories ofreality, thereby understanding the boundary between the philosophy ofscience and the science ofscience. Although it is the subject ofmany questions inphilosophy ofscience and epistemology, the problem ofboundaries, usually, focuses on the nature ofscientific realism as applied toscience.

The boundary between science and the philosophy ofscience is so contested that the most common method used todivide asubject is todemarcate the boundary between methods that produce data (or results) and tools that enable the collection and analysis ofdata (e.g. ideas, laws, structures, models, etc.).

The differentiation ofthe methods and tools that are used from those that define the method and tools is critical inthe demarcation problem because it determines which parts ofscience are science and which arenot.

When someone tries tocross the frontier inscience, he begins toconsider the philosophy ofscience, and both can be seen as aform ofresearch.

Boundary problem and boundary demarcation refers tothe dichotomy between formal science conducted byscientists and their approach todata collection and their use ofdata collection results.

Questions ofthe demarcation problem concern these different ways ofresearching the natural world byscientists.

Many philosophical questions have been raised totry todefine the boundary between science and the philosophy ofscience. Many philosophers have tried tofind acore offundamental beliefs held byscientific disciplines, which would allow us toseparate scientific positions from the positions ofthe philosophy ofscience.

The theory ofscientific realism, according towhich scientific hypotheses can be derived from the real world and tested scientifically, is often the subject ofcontroversy when delineating. According tothese principles ofscientific realism, it is generally believed that any theory ofreality is at least partially correct, and that any claim tothe contrary should be questioned. According tothis theory, all scientific methods available toscientists (and everyone else) are equally effective and there are no gaps inhuman knowledge. It is afundamental element ofscientific realism that is often the subject ofcontroversy between scientists and philosophers ofscience. This objection can be challenged with aslightly more technical side ofthe issue, citing the existence ofmany fundamental principles ofscience that are outside the realm ofhuman knowledge, and for example, such things as the existence ofcertain numbers.

More humorously, the use ofaphysical model, and therefore the existence ofareal equivalent toNewtons Newton, is often used torefute many ofthe claims made byphilosophers ofscience.

Cognitive or interpersonal realism theory suggests that science is not fundamentally different from social and artistic endeavors. These forms ofinquiry are often criticized as aform ofbiased or unverifiable belief systems that lack asense ofobjective or subjective truth. Some argue that these forms ofresearch are, inasense, simply human-made. Proponents ofthis view argue that there is afundamental drive toexplore and learn about the natural world, and that any claims about objective truth are subjective tothat drive. These positions have been used inthe past tochallenge the ethics ofhow science can be used toinfluence apersons beliefs or behavior. Summarizing this, we can say that any statement that is or can be made without an objective basis is not scientific.

Cognitive / intersubjective stance can be tested byasking people toanswer questions about how scientists behave and what standards they use tovalidate their claims.

People who accept the theory and accept the creation ofcausal models inwhich the universe operates are considered credible if they provide the foundation for that theory through logic and consistency.

Thus, the use ofthe inductive approach is usually seen as alegitimate means ofdefining truth inscience. However, the use ofinductive inference tosupport any general theory can be criticized.

Arguments for the validity ofthe inductive approach include the following: the use ofobservations is generally biased and subjective, the data must be manipulated toarrive at valid conclusions, the data must be used causally, people may behave inabiased manner inreporting their observations, people who accept some scientific theory tend tohave the best critical thinking skills, and objectivity and testability are often associated with pure science.

The controversy continues after more than two millennia ofdialogue between philosophers ofscience and scientists invarious fields, despite broad agreement on the foundations ofthe scientific method. When considering the work ofmodern researchers, the question often arises which elements ofscience are responsible for the outstanding discoveries ofthe last few decades: quantum mechanics, the theory ofrelativity, the Big Bang, the Large Hadron Collider, or, perhaps more recently, the Higgs boson. Indeed, at the forefront ofall these achievements is the first principle ofmodern physics the laws ofnature do not change. However, inrecent decades we have learned that some phenomena do change and that science is not atrue fact ofnature; it is aconstantly developing company. However, byits very nature, science is very diverse, and understanding how different branches ofscience refer tothese fundamental principles is critical if we want tounderstand the evolution ofour knowledge. It is often noted that there is no reason toseek truth, because truth is inherent innature. The philosopher Ivan Ilyin, born inRussia, pointed out that truth is not the same as wisdom. We can make great advances inscience byexploring how reality works. Bydiscovering how nature can collapse under its own weight, inthe form ofblack holes or the Big Bang, we learn more about the universe than thinking about why it has the properties we observe. The philosopher Roger Scruton does not understand the nature oftruth so easily, and he quotes Cicero: Ithink that everything that is false at first glance seems tobe right, because the question inquestion is the truth ofwhat he says and does. Scruton insists that truth has two distinct meanings, which he calls manifestly incompatible and contradictory. The first is the absolute truth, which must be arrived at through observation and experiment. The second is asubjective concept oftruth based on the knowledge ofpersonal experience toarrive at beliefs and decisions. Scruton considers this understanding tobe the correct foundation for intellectual life. The logical conclusion follows from this that criticality the idea that our beliefs are based on empirical evidence and intellectual rigor the pursuit oftruth are infact complementary aspects ofscientific endeavor. But as the philosophy ofscience advanced and we learned more about the fundamentals ofnature, we saw that the very concept oftruth is not literal. All ofthis has profound implications for the study ofscience. The concept ofthe second law ofthermodynamics, according towhich entropy (rather than energy) always increases, is part ofthe mathematical identity ofopposites, which essentially describes how an object inan open system attracts an infinitesimal amount ofenergy into its environment. However, inthe late 1990s, physicist Lawrence Krauss and colleagues discovered that there were forms ofmatter that did not obey this mathematical law, and when they observed certain black holes, these anomalies told them that the second law ofthermodynamics might not always be true. Since then, Krauss has made acareer ofapplying science toquestions that physics and theology cannot answer, from the philosophy ofspace and time tothe problem offree will. Krauss drew an excellent analogy for scientific discovery, but there is another serious objection. Krauss argued that when ahuman form, such as acell, encounters acertain obstacle, it can be inastate ofthermodynamic imbalance or inastate ofunstable disorder. But what does this have todo with the nature ofthings inthe universe? For example, if the ocean suddenly dries up, how can we explain this? If our eyes could perceive physical changes, we might assume that whatever we perceive and perceive as an abstract phenomenon is created at this very moment something really happens the moment our eyes detect the image. However, the presence ofthe emergent effect makes us realize that the scope ofwhat we can observe was limited. An emergent effect, bydefinition, does not imply achange inthe physical world. Thus, thermodynamic disequilibrium describes amacroscopic phenomenon, while emerging dynamics is away ofdescribing the microscopic itself. For example, William J. Boyd, aphilosopher ofscience at Duke University, argues that the well-known observation ofthe three lobes ofthe brain suggests that some distinction still needs tobe made between micro and macro.

Metaphysical tautology

Judging the veracity ofstatements about how reality functions based on their simplicity may seem like aremarkable achievement. Who can be sure, with all our modern technologies, that the Universe is what we see infront ofus? Applying the Pythagorean theorem or saying that God is omnipotent is like using aruler tomeasure the curvature ofthe universe. This, ofcourse, does not mean that we cannot understand how true these and other self-evident statements about the nature ofreality are. The problem, however, is that the enormous vastness ofthe universe and the extremely complex processes that we observe can be so overwhelming that they prevent us from thinking about possible alternative possibilities. We may want tochange our minds, change our understanding ofthe world, but changing our perception is difficult, since most ofwhat we observe is impossible toknow. There are probably amillion elements, each with atrillion different properties. And we cannot know with certainty about their internal structure or their functional interaction with each other. This fact does not prevent us from noticing them, using our feelings and interacting with them, but makes us very suspicious oftheir origin and existence. When we find ourselves insuch mysterious situations, we are disturbed bythe feeling that something is wrong with our knowledge. We use words such as tautology and contradiction todescribe situations inwhich there are seemingly mutually exclusive statements describing the same situation. This is similar tothe tautological statement, Arose is arose is arose, which is obviously true, and yet can be used as proof ofthe absurdity ofthe entire biological kingdom. The many patterns ofexperience that we perceive make us realize that something is fundamentally wrong with our state ofknowledge. And we are both puzzled and suspicious ofthis mistake, as if we are inthe position ofan innocent person being questioned bythe police. Why cant we just understand reality as it is? Why does the laws ofnature seem tobe created for our own amusement? This is another reason for the lack ofarational connection between science and theology. Both disciplines require knowledge that we cannot acquire inthisway.

Tounderstand what appears tobe meaningless, there must be some transcendental reality towhich the laws ofnature do not apply. The existence ofGod provides this transcendental basis for understanding the world and allows us torecognize that we do not know the nature ofreality at best.

We use our senses and think about experience inaway that completely avoids the rational aspect ofour brains. The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle inhis work Physics argued that our perception ofthe world does not reflect external reality. His view ofconsciousness and our mental processes was that they do not reflect external reality. Inhis work, he has developed abody ofknowledge related toasubset ofthe natural world, including the composition ofmatter, the movement ofcelestial bodies, the study ofthe growth ofplants and animals and so on. His philosophy was based on his understanding ofhow these processes work and their implications for human existence. His view ofthe world was empirical, since he believed that our observations ofthe natural world can only be explained byreference tophysical processes. The problem was that he could not explain why our observations ofthe world did not reflect the external reality ofthe world inany objective, scientific way. His explanation ofconsciousness, based on external reality, was also unsatisfactory.

Aristotle argued that the reason things seem tous tocorrespond toexternal reality was because we are unconsciously influenced byother beings we perceive, but this cannot be the reason that we observe things inthe same order. The problem is that we are usually unaware ofthese influences, and therefore we have no way ofknowing how the forces that act on us affect our perception. Thus, although it seems that we should see something this way because we experience it inthis way, we do not. Moreover, we cannot use our senses toanalyze how we perceive the world. This is the case where the explanation for perception must come from some form ofexternalism, inwhich our experience is not controlled byour brain, but rather determined byother external factors. For example, imagine that we are inouter space and look at the Earth, which for our senses seems like adistant star. Inthis case, we would be inan alien and alternative reality, and our experience would not have abasis inthe nature ofreality.

Another problem with the experience system, which must proceed from external reality, is that it cannot explain the diversity ofour experience. We are inasystem that gives us multiple and different experiences. While externalism gives us an explanation ofwhy our experience is like this, it cannot give us an explanation ofwhy our perception ofthese things is different. Thus, some externalist views argue that it is simply how differently we perceive things; others argued that different experiences could be explained on amore primitive or psychological level.

The philosopher William James developed an important doctrine tojustify his view ofthe externalist theory ofexperience. This teaching is known as the law ofsimilarities. James argued that each ofus associates astimulus with acertain object with which it has no physical connection, but is an object with which we can interact. We can imagine this object as having adifferent physical form or appearance than the object we originally respondedto.

The similarity law is an explanation ofwhy we perceive the world inthis way. This explains why the externalist explanation ofour experience ofthings does not work.

While the law ofsimilarity itself is not ageneral explanation ofhow we perceive things, it explains why we are able toreact tothings differently from how we react tothings that we encounter inthe outside world. However, this does not explain why some people have different sensory experiences. This question has long been discussed inphilosophy, but the most commonly proposed solution is related tocognitive abilities. One position is that the law ofsimilarity explains why there are some people who do not perceive things inthe same way as others. However, the hypothesis that this law is based on ageneral truth, the truth that explains why people do not see things the same way, is usually viewed as not supported bymost philosophers. Instead, the main explanation suggested is that some ofthe differences insensory experience can be explained on amore subtle level. For example, we may see an apple differently because ofwhat we know about that apple. We know that the green apple was ofthe same species as the apple we see infront ofus now, and therefore the differences inperception that we see are due toour knowledge.

Proponents ofthis mistaken view often misuse the law ofsimilarity. While the concept ofthe Law ofSimilarity explains why we perceive things differently than other people, it does not explain why we perceive things the way. Inmy opinion, the reason why we perceive the world the way we do it is related tothe processes ofperception, which are not limited tosimilarities.

An early attempt at demarcation can be seen inthe efforts ofGreek natural philosophers and medical practitioners toseparate their methods and their descriptions ofnature from the mythological or mystical stories oftheir predecessors and contemporaries.

Plato first described his concept oftimesis, embodied the Aristotelian faith inhuman consciousness, inhis Timaeus and insubsequent works.

The doctrine that perception is natural and not divine was atheme he developed inhis Phaedra, which spoke ofaghostly body (aphysical representation ofan idea that aperson is awareof).

Phaedrus also focused on the problem ofuniversal knowledge, stating that everyone has access toall nature, but uses the only method available tothem their own perception.

The question ofwhether the material objects perceived bythem are real or simply the result ofperception has not been understood as amatter offaith.

Thomas Aquinas followed Aristotle and expanded on Platos ideas inthe early thirteenth century inhis Summa Theologica.

He believed that people can use their senses todetermine intellectually the existence or non-existence ofobjects ofperception.

It means that objects do not exist for the senses without our knowledge, but they exist, at least for those who have the ability torecognize their existence.

Thomas Hobbes argued that all objects can be cognized, although there is only one truth. Only human senses can know everything; all other knowledge is the result ofassumptions.

Inhis later works, Thomas expanded his theories about the subjective relationship between sensory perception and sensitivity. The intellect can only perceive those things that exist, or at least exist inthe realm ofthe senses; athought that transcends this sphere ofdiscrimination is known as apoetic concept.

Some philosophers have concluded that aphilosopher can only perceive truth through the creation ofaconsciousness that precedes his or her own feelings. He must create pure consciousness before he can perceive the world, and thus he will gain access tothe essence ofthings or knowledge about it. With apure consciousness, aChristian can see what the Lord has seen, and he can become the unique being that God created him tobe. Christian mysticism views nature as aliving being created bythe hand ofGod; without the power ofChrist, nature is considered ameaningless mass ofmaterial.

Comparing this with Thomas Aquinas, it becomes obvious that he distinguishes his ideas from those ofPlato and Aristotle. His concepts can be summarized as follows: Faith, not reason, determines what can be cognized, and reason determines what cannot be cognized.

Thomas was not aware ofthe various philosophical doctrines that developed after his death, it is more likely that he tried tosynthesize different ideas and developed hisown.

Thomas Aquinas inhis work Sum against the Gentiles noted that although God is the only possible reason tobelieve inHis existence, aperson can perceive and know the existence ofGod through other reasons (namely, experience and logic) Inmany cases, these alternative causes are obvious only tothose who are not inthe immediate presence ofthe object inquestion.

Later, Thomas developed and expanded these ideas inhis later works tosuch an extent that they turned out tobe his own ideas, rather than the ideas ofthe ancient philosophers with whom he was inspired.

InChristianity, Augustine Hippopotamus created his own theory ofknowledge based on reason and experience. Augustine believed that the world is asingle organism, and all things are products ofone essence God. Augustine believed that the intellect ofGod is active and separate from the physical intellect ofthe world; physical intelligence could only comprehend the world through experience. Using this concept, Augustine wrote that an ignorant person cannot have true knowledge ofthe world, but can only gain imperfect knowledge given tohim through experience. An example ofthis would be if an ignorant person describes his experience with atree; the knowledge ofGod will be expanded through real experience.

Augustine taught that for true knowledge ofthe world it is necessary toknow the place, qualities and characteristics ofvarious things inthe world, but this knowledge was often very difficult toobtain. Augustine believed that nature should be greater than physical; it had tobe experienced spiritually and immaterially. Inhis City ofGod, Augustine expands on his ideas about knowledge bysaying that one must receive revelation through faith inJesus Christ inorder totruly know the nature ofGod. Augustine also noted that apersons relationship with God is arelationship oflove, not commitment.

Augustine believed that the true knowledge ofthe Lord was superior toany other knowledge, and that his knowledge was separate from the knowledge ofother people. This was similar toAristotles belief that human knowledge innature was very limited because the human mind had not fully developed its potential.

Augustine also wrote that any true knowledge ofthe nature ofGod or the meaning oflife comes toman through faith inJesus Christ. Augustine also created his own cosmological system ofthe universe, inwhich he believed that the earth and all other natural objects are aphysical manifestation ofthe divine. Totruly understand the universe or the true meaning oflife, you need tohave faith inJesus Christ and salvation.

Christians ofthe Christian Reformed tradition held some views similar tothose ofAugustine, although they generally differed from his ideas inthat they believed that human knowledge ofthe world and the universe is limited.

Augustines doctrines and theological views began tospread throughout Europe inthe sixteenth century with the works ofJohn Calvin, Thomas Cranmer, and others.

The Roman Catholic Church held ahigher degree ofrationalism and believed that theology and metaphysics were unnecessary for salvation. However, the Roman Catholic Church did not reject the theology ofAugustine, as it was ofthe opinion that it should be part ofhuman understanding, and, therefore, aperson is limited inhis knowledge. The Roman Catholic Church was divided inits views on faith even regarding the ideas ofAugustine, although the majority believed that human knowledge is limited, and therefore the only thing that salvation extends tois the doctrines ofGod.

Calvin himself was aCalvinist and adhered tothe same ideas as Augustine, but added two different ideas toAugustine: inafirst, Calvin believed that human knowledge is limited, but that through the Holy Spirit and faiths inman can reach the knowledge ofthe rational nature ofGod and secondly, that man is limited inhis understanding ofthe nature ofGod, but through his actions he can achieve an understanding ofGod.

However, John Calvin rejected the doctrine that man was limited inhis understanding ofthe universe; Calvin believed that through faith aperson can know the universe and understandGod.

Jean Calvin also explained Augustines epistemology and added that Augustine believed that everyone can receive aclear revelation about God through the Holy Spirit, through faith, and through reason.

Inthe sixteenth century, Johannes Reuchlin, an associate ofJean Calvin, was the first towrite about Augustines philosophy, especially his doctrine ofintelligence. Reuchlin made little reference toAugustines doctrine ofgrace, but rather toAugustines theology. Augustine always believed that the intellectual abilities ofpeople are limited, and Reuchlin believed that this limited ability is the reason for apersons need for salvation. Augustine taught that man is sinful and, as aresult, cannot attain true knowledge. Reuchlin rejected Augustines teaching that humans are incapable ofunderstanding the universe and that they need faith inGod and use reason tobe saved. Reuchlin believed that regarding Augustines view that human knowledge ofGod and the universe is limited, Reuchlin believed that Augustines view was wrong.

Augustine, according toReuchlin, was wrong inteaching that man cannot receive true knowledge ofthe universe, but that man can attain knowledge through faith and the Holy Spirit inthe knowledge ofGod. Although Augustine believed that human knowledge is limited, Reuchlin believed that human knowledge ofthe universe is unlimited. Reuchlin believed that with the help ofreason, aperson can receive aclear revelation about God and the universe.

Reuchlin was the first tosuggest that human intelligence has unlimited potential. However, Reuchlin believed that apersons ability toknow is limited and that he can achieve knowledge ofGod only through faith and through the Holy Spirit.

Augustine believed that God is perfect, just, and good. Reuchlin believed that God was good and perfect, but the attributes ofperfection were ofsuch anature that man could not achieve them. Reuchlin believed that the knowledge ofGod can be obtained through faith.

Reuchlins followers adhered toaform ofCalvinism known as systematic theology.

Augustine, like Calvin, believed that human knowledge ofGod and the universe is limited. John Calvin, however, believed that mans knowledge ofthe Universe is not limited, and believed that man is able tounderstand the Universe.

Calvin believed that mans knowledge ofGod and the Universe is limited, but the use ofreason can bring this limitation toman. Calvin did not believe that mans ability toknow the universe is limited.

It was not unusual for asixteenth-century theologian tohold different views ofthe nature ofGod.

St. Augustine believed that through the Holy Spirit people can learn. This made him reject the system ofmodalism and force him toadhere tothe doctrine oftheosis, according towhich aperson can achieve astate ofperfect communion withGod.

Montaigne, aFrench philosopher and poet, wrote about Augustines epistemology and the knowledge ofGod. Montaigne believed that human knowledge is limited and that God can only be known through faith inGod and the use ofreason.

Montaigne believed that aperson cannot have true knowledge ofGod without the help ofGod and the Holy Spirit. Montaigne believed that the truth offaith is the only knowledge that can produce true knowledge. Montaigne believes that there is only one and final truth, and that knowledge is obtained through faith inthe absolute one God. Montaigne believed that faith, according toAugustine, is ameans ofknowledge, and the truth offaith is true knowledge. This led Montaigne tobelieve that if aperson believes inabeing outside the universe and if this being has infinite knowledge, then the person will reach astate that is known toGod.

Gottfried Leibniz believed that human intelligence is limited byreason. Leibniz believed that man is limited inhis understanding ofthe Universe, because he is limited bynatural laws that limit his ability toperceive the Universe inits entirety.




Interpretation


Aristotle described indetail what scientific knowledge ofsomething means. Tobe scientific, he said, one has todeal with causes, use logical evidence, and identify universals that are inherent inparticulars ofmeaning.

The use ofthe senses must be consistent with our scientific research. As inAncient Greece, we are fascinated bythe mysteries ofthe world around us. There is an amazing world ofform and formlessness, which is so indescribable, while inside we can see the complex details ofreality and make judgments about what is right and what is wrong. We study all aspects ofour experience and discover the universals and peculiarities ofour experience.

We use the terms ofour feelings as if they were nothing more than an abstract idea that we can integrate inour mind tosee something or be something, but never think ofit as aphysical thing.

Here, according toAristotle, there is an image ofthe sciences as images ofeach other. First, we have our own feelings, which we work with as if they were our abstract concepts. We perceive the table and turn it tosee the reality ofits hardness, the variations inits composition, the presence ofchairs around it and the difference incolor between them, and then we turn our eyes again tolook at our concept. This concept is like apainting or film, and we turn our eyes tosee the whole reality ofthat picture or film.

There is science as apicture ofreality that uses our sensory experience, but has nothing todo with it. Our knowledge inphysics is similar toour science offeelings and therefore consists ofmany thoughts ofphilosophers and scientists who came before us, who looked deeply into this world and saw its beauty and horror. The true image ofour physics is anew world that offers an understanding ofthe nature ofthe natural world, the material world.

There is science as something that follows and develops from the science ofthe past. Each ofus is born with ascientific education that we must use tosolve our current problems and understand what really is inour experience. We must learn everything we can from the first stage ofscience, sensory experience, and use this knowledge toreach the second stage and then the third. Only inthis way can we hope toreach the fourth stage, inwhich we comprehend the unknown universe ofuniversal qualities.

Let me look at the works ofAristotle and compare them with modern scientific and mathematical journals. Iwant tocompare science with other areas ofknowledge such as philosophy, mathematics, and soon.

Modern scientific journals are compiled and edited byan elite group ofscientists. Their contributions are assessed on the basis ofmathematical and conceptual methods that are equivalent tothe interpretations ofPlato and Aristotle.

Mathematics master ofeverything inscience. Thus, all sciences are incomplete, and only mathematics is the absolute inour world.

So what does this have todo with your thesis? What ideas inyour own research and what you say about it are wrong? What do you think is not true and how can you learn tounderstand the world differently?

Ihave often asked myself this question. While trying tomake sense ofmy research, Ifound that when Itried toapproach my topic scientifically, Icompletely failed. When Iapproach it as apure idea, and not as areal, concrete image, it turns out that it is much easier tounderstand.

What was my method? Ithink there are things we can do if we approach our work from anew perspective.

M s can use their own conceptual knowledge. When you look at something inthe real world, you can see what it is without trying toput it into words. But when you try toexpress aconcept inwords, you see something different, and therefore the translation cannot really reflect reality.

That is why sometimes it is very difficult tounderstand something, even if we are familiar with it. When someone talks about something, our mind tries toclothe this concept inasimple and understandable form, inwords. This is what actually happens when we try toexplain something inwords. What we mean is not that there is orange, but there is awhole, complex universe around it. But we dont have agood way todescribe such things, so we try toput it into words.

This is anatural thing, and we do it all the time when we try todescribe the concepts oflife, money, sports or the universe. There is an idea ofwhat it is, but it is not always the same. When our mind tries toput it into words, we see something different. For example, when we try todescribe aplate offood, we do not see aplate full oforange dale e k. We see acomplex system ofshapes, colors and smells. So if we cannot describe it inwords, we try toabstract it into symbols. We use our knowledge ofthis complex system totry todescribe what wesee.

When we write an essay, the images we are using will be represented inred, the idea will be represented ingreen, and the idea ofabstraction will be represented inblue. We can denote certain objects inorange, some blue, and so on, but on the way torepresent these things will be different. We use this symbol torepresent various ideas. This is how we conceptualize things, and since we conceptualize them, this is how we interpret them.

What we see is actually aseries ofreal and imaginary things inacomplex combination. The world is acomplex system that is constantly changing, so the way we try todescribe it is constantly changing. This is what Icall the illusory universe.

So why dont we just see the world as it really is? Well, because we cant. We do not see it as it really is, and we cannot explain it inwords. This is why we use words. This is how we represent what wesee.

This is one ofthe important parts ofmy approach. Itry toapproach my topic from adifferent perspective. Ilook at this from the point ofview ofthe idea ofthe object, not from the point ofview ofhow it is actually seen. When my brain tries toexplain it, Istart looking at it from adifferent perspective. Im starting tosee this as aseries ofsymbols.

How can this understanding be translated? What do we do when we see something we shouldnt see? We must abstract ourselves from this. Inother words, we move toanother level and interpret the scene interms ofsymbols. We use symbols tosee things, but symbols are not what they actually appear.

We can see what we shouldnt see, so we interpret the scene and explain it with symbols. Togo one level higher, we use these symbols toabstract from the scene and explain it interms ofreality. This level ofabstraction is what we have todo tomake it easier tounderstand the world. This level ofabstraction is what we have todo tosimplify the explanation ofthe world. The point ofthis is tohelp us understand everything we have ever been taught and understand everything that is happening aroundus.




Logical positivism


Logical positivism, formulated inthe 1920s, held that only statements about facts or logical relationships between concepts make sense. These statements are not called sentences, but are said torepresent true beliefs.

It should be noted, however, that although mereological statements may be false, logical positivists also considered them factual, so the proper name for such statements is perception.

Logical positivists believe that while such claims are possible, they must be false anyway.

Logical positivism originated inHegelian philosophy, especially inhis dialectics and its criticism. While making some dialectical criticism ofdeterminism, determinism itself was not part ofthe Marxist analysis.

The philosopher Karl Popper proposed asynthesis oflogical positivism, functionalism and socialism. Popper popularized the use ofthe term positivism.

Logical positivism, formulated inthe 1920s, argued that the truth ofastatement is whatever is consistent with observable facts.

The concept ofatruth principle inmodern logic does not imply this for example, the statement that all numbers are rational is not really astatement about what is true, but only about what can be proved.

Logical positivists also do not exclude so-called non-empirical statements.

The statement that x or y is more likely tobe true inthe case ofX as opposed tothe case Y requires that X and Y be consistent statements, which they claim tobe means that logical positivists must argue that truths ofthis kind are not really truths or truths ofthe world.

However, most subsequent systems ofepistemology, such as realism, positivism, and analytical philosophy, tend toassume that logical positivists were right insaying that there are non-empirical statements that are also true.

Practical applications such as medicine and legal practice tend tofocus on statements that can be falsified or supported, and thus the assertion that true statements are necessarily true is removed from the problem ofdetermining whether aparticular statement is true or false

However, since modern theories ofmind and cognition are still often based on the traditional form ofempiricism, the problem ofnon-empirical statements is still relevant.

The statement that x is more likely tobe true inthe case ofX than inthe case ofY is often viewed as an example ofareduction axiom with axioms ofthe form x and y. truth is perceived as an obvious axiom ofthe existence ofarelationship.

However, it has also been argued that such arguments presuppose the idea that there is no cognitive system and therefore no belief system that can speak ofsomething other than itself, aview that has not gained widespread acceptance.

Aparticularly important form oflogical positivism that is commonly associated with the scientific method has come tobe known as logical empiricism and is closely related tothe knowledge argument for the existence ofGod.

Inthe nineteenth century, Russell, Frege and most logical positivists defended the strong version ofthe thesis ofthe logical positivists: the logical positivism, i.e. an adequate and correct theory ofknowledge itself is atrue science. Since then, this thesis has been questioned bysome adherents oflogical empiricism.

After Wittgensteins theory ofconcepts Wittgenstein influenced the logic, some ofwhom believe that what is true for proposals (including the logical positivists) is true for any concepts, and some ofthem believe that the truth ofone kind oftruth is usually and necessarily linked with truths ofadifferent kind.

The new thesis arose as aresult ofthe development ofWittgensteins philosophy. Most logical positivists denied the possibility ofmetaphysics; but there were some who thought that metaphysics was wrong on only one occasion, and that was when it gave meaning tothings that didnt really make sense.

Some logical positivists took this position and argued that metaphysics should only be taught inprimary schools, if at all, and that metaphysics should have no place inhigher education or professions. Others, however, argued that this position is inconsistent.

Russell called the first position twice negative logic.

Inthe second position, double positive logic describes the usual human use oflanguage inwhich there is no opposition between sentences that imply or make sense ofeach other.

When Wittgenstein and his followers speak ofan intentional binding relationship, they mean that the word must refer tosomething else inorder tohave meaning.

From this point ofview, there is no metaphysics or even the science ofmetaphysics, because there is no opposite entity inthe universe.

Many ofthe conclusions Wittgenstein is t e, which are known as anti comprehensionist, infact, they argue that any relation between the world and the human mind, there mustbe.

Inhis Remarks on Foundations ofMathematics, Wittgenstein argued that (at least briefly and inextremely restrictive terms) there is no truth, reality or existence as we know them.

Inhis Treatise on Human Knowledge, and inhis treatise on logic and philosophy, Wittgenstein believed that an attempt toexplain the world offormal logic was likely togive afalse idea ofreality. Logical positivists were inprinciple open tothese objections.

Wittgenstein later argued that the rejection oftranscendental idealism (and therefore ontology) was amajor mistake oflogical positivists, because it led them tomisunderstand the nature ofobjects. He called their position superstitious because it is based on the false belief that one can distinguish what is real from what is false, which he himself considered dubious.

According toWittgenstein, it is obvious tological positivists that nothing real can matter and that everything that is either aphenomenon or an illusion (or something that can be called aphenomenon or an illusion). He called the approach ofthe logical positivists superstitious because it is based on the assumption that they can only explain the world bythe terms on which we are allowed tospeak ofwhat is real, and that they did not realize that reality cannot be treated inthisway.

As Wittgenstein argued, and as Fodor and Eilanden argued for his arguments, it is impossible tospeak ofthe world using the terms adopted bylogical positivists, and it is meaningless tosay that it is possible todescribe the world with the conditions theyuse.

Wittgensteins arguments show that it is impossible toexplain the world inthe language oflogic (or his paradigm oflanguage, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus).

One ofthe results is that Wittgenstein believed that aperson cannot even speak about what is real using the language oflogic, since logic cannot identify what is real. He also argued that it is impossible toidentify that which is possible with the terms inwhich they speak about him (and, inthe same way, it is impossible toidentify that which is unreal with the terms inwhich they speak about him).

According toWittgenstein, both unreal and impossible can be defined based on the terms used todescribe them.

It is important tonote that all this talk about the language used todescribe reality and the language used toidentify things that cannot be spoken toare entirely conceptual. It is not at all obvious that language ingeneral, or logic ofstatements inparticular, can be used todescribe reality or what is impossible.

Logical positivists took Wittgenstein s arguments about what they were, about the impossibility ofdescribing the world inlanguage, as about the meaninglessness ofstatements. And inlater life, Wittgenstein seems tohave adopted the positivist assumption that language does not matter and cannot distinguish the unreal from the real.

However, this logical positivism is actually much more concrete than is usually assumed.

Inthe Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, Wittgenstein argued that judgment is meaningful only if it can be used todetermine, within agiven language system, whether something is real.

Thus, from alinguistic point ofview, we could say that the word non-existence (nihil) or the phrase there is no such thing as non-existence (gaunenlos siegen nicht) are meaningless expressions.

It is important tonote that the Tractatus does not state that the only sentence that matters is the true sentence. It is possible todefine sentences inlanguages inwhich it is impossible tosay anything about the meaning ofasentence so that they can be used todefine what is real, and Wittgenstein even argued that sentences insuch languages make sense.

The term theory is used byWittgenstein inacompletely different way. For him, theory is aformal system (inthe sense ofthe language oftheory) inwhich anumber ofstatements about the real are attributed toobjects and properties inthe model ofthe world.

It is not immediately obvious that it is possible todefine amodel ofthe world inthe sense inwhich Wittgenstein used the term, but he did. The model ofthe world that Wittgenstein defines inthis context is not aphysical model, but alogical model. (This can be viewed as the same as how some prefer tothink ofit as amodel ofagiven mathematical theory.)

Atheory intheoretical language is aset ofstatements about the real that can be used todetermine the reality ofsomething.

Agood example ofatheory is Einsteins special theory ofrelativity, which, thanks tothe use ofamathematical formal language, is perfectly suited todescribe what happens toan observer inaspecial system ofrelativistic physics.

If the model ofthe world doesnt really explain everything about the world, then it may not be avery good model afterall.

Indeed, some say that the logical positivist system can actually explain more about the world than any theory it discusses. But if the system oflogical positivism is not avery good model ofthe world, it can still be used todetermine whether something is real.

Touse Wittgensteins terminology, the distinction between the real and the unreal for Wittgenstein is visual.

For logical positivists, the world is non-visual.

Wittgenstein, however, does not regard the world as" non-visual, "and even if it were, it would not be aproblem: it is entirely possible todescribe the world invisual language. Inany case, the world is avisual object, even if the universe it is inisnot.

The central theme ofWittgensteins later philosophy is his view that language cannot distinguish between the real and the unreal, that the world is an understandable world, and that the meaning ofastatement can be determined using this statement.

Some critics have argued that these views do not challenge the traditional position that the world is understandable, but that they do challenge the old position that language cannot be used todistinguish the real from the unreal.




Development ofontological relativism


According toAlfred Jules Ayer, metaphysicians claim tohave aknowledge ofreality that [transcends] the phenomenal world. Ayer, amember ofthe Vienna Circle and awell-known English logical positivist, argued that it was impossible tomake any statements about the world outside ofdirect sensory perception. If an empirical statement such as The earth revolves around the sun, Ayer argues, is astatement about the world outside the realm ofsense perception, then that too cannot be explained.

The Philosopher John F. Bennett formulated the ontological anti-realistic" view oftruth and truthfulness, which defies the spirit ofontological relativism that permeates much ofmetaphysics and against what Ayer, George Dyson and many other philosophers opposed tocompeting concepts ofmetaphysics inthe 20- m and 21st centuries.

Ontological realism inphilosophy is the idea that objects exist independently oftheir behavior and relationships. Realism inthis sense means that the objects inquestion and their relationships are real and do not depend on our beliefs and opinions. According toontological realism, the truth ofany statement about the relationship ofan object, for example, the table is actually atable, does not depend on the persons beliefs about the table, for example, atable is probably achair or apersons opinion about the relationship ofatable toachair, for example part ofthe table, or even the relation ofachair toatable. For example, whether aperson is sitting at atable depends on the statement the table is the table, which is areal statement. Ontological realism is usually associated with the positions oflogical positivists. This school ofthought emerged inthe mid-1800s as areaction toCartesianism, which dominated the philosophy ofscience at the time.

Bennett argued that inaccordance with ontological realism, people cannot know about objects or their relationships, because the logical consequences ofthis will be contradictory, that is, the very concept oftruth (as opposed toan opinion or assumption), going beyond the phenomenal world, is impossible For example, people cannot know about atable, and therefore the very concept ofatable is beyond experience. The logical consequence ofthis fact is that the right todeny the existence ofan object cannot be justified. As Bennett puts it, if [an object] has no informative power other than our relationship with the world, then we are able not only toknow its truth, but also toinsist on its truth with thoughts, our own and others. The logical consequence ofontological anti-realism is that ontological statements about the world are invalid.

Bennett attributes ontological antirealism tological positivists. For Bennett, positivists questioned the idea that astatement about an objects relationship, such as atable is actually atable, is also astatement about that object, which Bennett calls an ontological statement. According toBennett, ontological statements are too abstract tobe true. For Bennett, an ontological statement about an object must represent the state ofaffairs with an object and must be able tojustify astatement about an object. Thus, from Bennetts point ofview, astatement about the relationship ofan object, such as atable is actually atable, is also atrue ontological statement, but its truth is incompatible with the truth ofanother ontological statement concerning the same object, that is, its relation tochair. Because ofthis incompatibility, statements about this object cannot be true if both statements are not true, which would be incompatible with the true nature ofthe object.




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Vadim Shmal Ph. D. Associate Professor RUSSIAN UNIVERSITY OF TRANSPORT (MIIT) Pavel Minakov Ph. D. Associate Professor RUSSIAN UNIVERSITY OF TRANSPORT (MIIT) Sergey Pavlov Master PLEKHANOV RUSSIAN UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS

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