Книга - The Prince

The Prince
Niccolò Machiavelli


HarperCollins is proud to present its new range of best-loved, essential classics.‘We have declared before that it is not only expedient but necessary for a prince to take care his foundations be good, otherwise his fabric will be sure to fail.’Considered one of the first works of modern philosophy, Machiavelli’s The Prince is an intense study on the nature of power and the course it should take when ruling a country and expresses the author’s strong and unyielding ideals and beliefs on using force rather than law to achieve your aims.Responsible for the widely-used phrase ‘Machiavellian’, with all of its negative connotations, his extreme treatise remains a classic text to this day.









THE PRINCE


Niccolò Machiavelli









CONTENTS


Cover (#u0227e6cd-e05f-5ecb-8a0e-a3f9ee1889f0)

Title Page (#u079b5f88-ad6b-5f6c-b9bc-eea9cd262e82)

Niccolò Machiavelli to the Most Illustrious Lorenzo, Son of Piero De’ Medici (#ulink_62e2d140-8cb6-5e81-88c4-882150dacee9)

Chapter 1 The several sorts of Governments, and after what manner they are obtained (#ulink_c410f64e-b932-5eba-90b4-9f7406a867a4)

Chapter 2 Of Hereditary Principalities (#ulink_189990bd-bb73-57d2-8227-af7698046475)

Chapter 3 Of Mixed Principalities (#ulink_6f9eaedb-6580-5254-8db5-609a24cc6a1a)

Chapter 4 Why the Kingdom of Darius, usurped by Alexander, did not rebel against his Successors, after Alexander was dead (#ulink_46f21710-511a-5594-af9b-74fd59f04271)

Chapter 5 How such Cities and Principalities are to be governed who lived under their own Laws before they were subdued (#ulink_e0869a52-8791-580c-8eee-7b406f1c6015)

Chapter 6 Of Principalities acquired by one’s own proper conduct and arms (#ulink_848306ac-08f8-5816-9bde-32be6a14fa8a)

Chapter 7 Of new Principalities acquired by accident and the supplies of other people (#ulink_b61ee1fa-9f10-5554-95f1-13f653af3d09)

Chapter 8 Of such as have arrived at their Dominion by wicked and unjustifiable means (#ulink_4a97356a-5339-503f-a40f-2d9afb33f202)

Chapter 9 Of Civil Principality (#ulink_56db4621-bb71-5490-8880-2e17be892ea8)

Chapter 10 How the strength of all Principalities is to be computed (#litres_trial_promo)

Chapter 11 Of Ecclesiastical Principalities (#litres_trial_promo)

Chapter 12 How many Forms there are of Military Discipline, and of those Soldiers which are called Mercenary (#litres_trial_promo)

Chapter 13 Of Auxiliaries, Mixed, and Natural Soldiers (#litres_trial_promo)

Chapter 14 The Duty of a Prince in relation to his Militia (#litres_trial_promo)

Chapter 15 Of such things as render Men (especially Princes) worthy of Blame or Applause (#litres_trial_promo)

Chapter 16 Of Liberality and Parsimony (#litres_trial_promo)

Chapter 17 Of Cruelty and Clemency, and whether it is best for a Prince to be beloved or feared (#litres_trial_promo)

Chapter 18 How far a Prince is obliged by his Promise (#litres_trial_promo)

Chapter 19 That Princes ought to be cautious of becoming either odious or contemptible (#litres_trial_promo)

Chapter 20 Whether Citadels, and other things which Princes many times do, be profitable or dangerous (#litres_trial_promo)

Chapter 21 How a Prince is to demean himself to gain reputation (#litres_trial_promo)

Chapter 22 Of the Secretaries of Princes (#litres_trial_promo)

Chapter 23 How Flatterers are to be avoided (#litres_trial_promo)

Chapter 24 How it came to pass that the Princes of Italy have most of them lost their dominions (#litres_trial_promo)

Chapter 25 How far in human affairs Fortune may avail, and in what manner she may be resisted (#litres_trial_promo)

Chapter 26 An Exhortation to deliver Italy from the Barbarians (#litres_trial_promo)

Classic Literature: Words and Phrases Adapted from the Collins English Dictionary (#litres_trial_promo)

About the Author (#litres_trial_promo)

History of Collins (#litres_trial_promo)

Copyright (#litres_trial_promo)

About the Publisher (#litres_trial_promo)




Niccolò Machiavelli to the Most Illustrious Lorenzo, Son of Piero De’ Medici (#ulink_2b39444e-d532-5517-bf06-47fcafcbc2c9)


Those who desire the favour of a prince do commonly introduce themselves by presenting him with such things as he either values much or does more than ordinarily delight in; for which reason he is frequently presented with horses, arms, cloth of gold, jewels, and such ornaments as are suitable to his quality and grandeur. Being ambitious to present myself to your Highness with some testimony of my devotions towards you, in all my wardrobe I could not find anything more precious (at least to myself) than the knowledge of the conduct and achievements of great men, which I learned by long conversation in modern affairs and a continual investigation of old. After long and diligent examination, having reduced all into a small volume, I do presume to present to your Highness; and though I cannot think it a work fit to appear in your presence, yet my confidence in your bounty is such, I hope it may be accepted, considering I was not capable of more than presenting you with a faculty of understanding in a short time, what for several years, with infinite labour and hazard, I had been gathering together. Nor have I beautified or adorned it with rhetorical ornations, or such outward embellishments as are usual in such descriptions. I had rather it should pass without any approbation than owe it to anything but the truth and gravity of the matter. I would not have it imputed to me as presumption, if an inferior person, as I am, pretend not only to treat of, but to prescribe and regulate the proceedings of princes; for, as they who take the landscape of a country, to consider the mountains and the nature of the higher places do descend ordinarily into the plains, and dispose themselves upon the hills to take the prospect of the valleys, in like manner, to understand the nature of the people it is necessary to be a prince, and to know the nature of princes it is as requisite to be of the people. May your Highness, then, accept this book with as much kindness as it is presented and if you please diligently and deliberately to reflect upon it you will find in it my extreme desire that your Highness may arrive at that grandeur which fortune and your accomplishments do seem to presage; from which pinnacle of honour, if your Highness vouchsafes at any time to look down upon things below, you will see how unjustly and how continually I have been exposed to the malignity of fortune.




CHAPTER 1 The several sorts of Governments, and after what manner they are obtained (#ulink_0222e2b3-062c-5fc5-be48-9203325d4fe5)


There never was nor is at this day any government in the world by which one man has rule and dominion over another, but it is either a commonwealth, or a monarchy. Monarchies are either hereditary, where the ancestors of the sovereign have been a long time in possession, or where they are but new. The new are either so wholly and entirely (as Milan was to Francis Sforza), or annexed to the hereditary dominions of the conqueror (as the kingdom of Naples to the kingdom of Spain). These territories thus acquired are accustomed either to be subject to some prince, or to live at liberty and free, and are subdued either by his auxiliaries or own forces, by his good fortune or conduct.




CHAPTER 2 Of Hereditary Principalities (#ulink_73ef767f-9529-5f50-846b-3b8bf2393ef9)


I shall omit speaking of commonwealths, as having discoursed of them largely elsewhere, and write in this place only of principalities, and how, according to the foregoing division, the said principalities may be governed and maintained. I do affirm, then, that hereditary states, and such as have been accustomed to the family of their prince, are preserved with less difficulty than the new, and because it is sufficient not to transgress the examples of their predecessors, and next to comply and frame themselves to the accidents that occur. So that, if the prince be a person of competent industry, he will be sure to keep himself in the throne, unless he be supplanted by some great and more than ordinary force; and even then, when so supplanted, fortune can never turn tail, or be adverse to the usurper, but he will stand fair to be restored. Of this Italy affords us an example in the Duke of Ferrara, who supported bravely against the invasion of the Venetians in 1484, and afterwards against Pope Julius X, upon no other foundation but his antiquity in that government; for a natural prince has not so much occasion or necessity to oppress his subjects, whereby it follows he must be better beloved, and retain more of the affections of his people, unless some extraordinary vices concur to make him odious; so that the succession and coherence of his government takes away the causes and memory of innovations; for one new change leaves always (as in buildings) a toothing and aptitude of another.




CHAPTER 3 Of Mixed Principalities (#ulink_af829ea8-7e76-5abe-a3ae-74df73164930)


But the difficulties consist in governments lately acquired, especially if not absolutely new, but as members annexed to the territories of the usurper, in which case such a government is called mixed. The tumults and revolutions in such monarchies proceed from a natural crossness and difficulty in all new conquests; for men do easily part with their prince upon hopes of bettering their condition, and that hope provokes them to rebel; but most commonly they are mistaken, and experience tells them their condition is much worse.

This proceeds from another natural and ordinary cause, necessitating the new prince to overlay or disgust his new subjects by quartering his army upon them, taxes, or a thousand other inconveniences, which are the perpetual consequents of conquest. So that you make them your enemies who suffer, and are injured by your usurpation, but cannot preserve their friendship who introduced you, because you are neither able to satisfy their expectation, or employ strong remedies against them, by reason of your obligations; wherefore, though an usurper be never so strong, and his army never so numerous, he must have intelligence with the natives if he means to conquer a province. For these reasons Louis XII of France quickly subdued Milan, and lost it as quickly; for the same people which opened him their gates, finding themselves deceived in their hopes, and disappointed in the future benefits which they expected, could not brook nor comport with the haughtiness of their new sovereign: it is very true countries that have rebelled and are conquered the second time are recovered with more difficulty; for the defection of the people having taken off all obligation or respect from the usurper, he takes more liberty to secure himself by punishing offenders, exposing the suspected, and fortifying wherever he finds himself weak; so that Count Lodovick having been able to rescue Milan out of the hands of the French the first time only by harassing and infesting its borders, the second time he recovered it it was necessary for him to arm and confederate the whole world against the said king, and that his army should be beaten and driven out of Italy; and this happened from the aforesaid occasions: nevertheless the French were twice dispossessed. The general reasons of the first we have already discoursed, it remains now that we take a prospect of the second, and declare what remedies the said King Louis had, or what another may have in his condition, to preserve himself better in his new conquests than the King of France did before him. I say, then, that provinces newly acquired, and joined to the ancient territory of him who conquered them, are either of the same country, or language, or otherwise. In the first case they are easily kept, especially if the people have not been too much accustomed to liberty; and to secure the possession there needs no more than to extirpate the family of the prince which governed before; for in other things maintaining to them their old condition, there being no discrepancy in their customs, men do acquiesce and live quietly, as has been seen in the cases of Burgundy, Bretagne, Gascoigne, and Normandy, which have continued so long under the government of France; for though there be some difference in their language, nevertheless, their laws and customs being alike, they do easily consist. He therefore who acquires anything, and desires to preserve it, is obliged to have a care of two things more particularly; one is, that the family of the former prince be extinguished; the other, that no law or taxes be imposed: whereby it will come to pass, that in a short time it may be annexed and consolidated with his old principality. But where conquest is made in a country differing in language, customs and laws, there is the great difficulty; their good fortune and great industry is requisite to keep it. And one of the best and most efficacious expedients to do it would be for the usurper to live there himself, which would render his possession more secure and durable, as the great Turk has done in Greece, who, in despite of all his practices and policies to keep it in subjection, had he not fixed his imperial residence there would never have been able to have effected it. For being present in person, disorders are discovered in the bud and prevented, but being at a distance in some remote part, they come only by hearsay, and that, when they are got to a head, are commonly incurable. Besides, the province is not subject to be pillaged by officers, by reason of the nearness and accessibleness of their prince, which disposes those to love him who are good, and those to dread him who are otherwise; and if any foreigner attacks it, he must do it with more care and circumspection, in respect that the prince’s residence being there it will be harder for him to lose it.

There is another remedy, rather better than worse, and that is, to plant colonies in one or two places, which may be as it were the keys of that State, and either that must be done of necessity, or an army of horse and foot be maintained in those parts, which is much worse; for colonies are of no great expense; the Prince sends and maintains them at very little charge, and intrenches only upon such as he is constrained to dispossess of their houses and land for the subsistence and accommodation of the new inhabitants, who are but few, and a small part of the State; they also who are injured and offended, living dispersed and in poverty, cannot do any mischief, and the rest being quiet and undisturbed, will not stir, lest they should mistake and run themselves into the same condition with their neighbours.

I conclude, likewise, that those colonies which are least chargeable are most faithful and inoffensive, and those few who are offended are too poor and dispersed to do any hurt, as I said before; and it is to be observed, men are either to be flattered and indulged or utterly destroyed—because for small offences they do usually revenge themselves, but for great ones they cannot—so that injury is to be done in such a manner as not to fear any revenge. But if instead of colonies an army be kept on foot, it will be much more expensive, and the whole revenue of that province being consumed in the keeping it, the acquisition will be a loss, and rather a prejudice than otherwise, by removing the camp up and down the country, and changing their quarters, which is an inconvenience every man will resent and be ready to revenge, and they are the most dangerous and implacable enemies who are provoked by insolences committed against them in their own houses. In all respects, therefore, this kind of guard is unprofitable, whereas on the other side colonies are useful. Moreover, he who is in a province of a different constitution, as is said before, ought to make himself head and protector of his inferior neighbours, and endeavour with all diligence to weaken and debilitate such as are more powerful, and to have a particular care that no stranger enters into the said province with as much power as he; for it will always happen that somebody or other will be invited by the malcontents, either out of ambition or fear. This is visible in the Etolians, who brought the Romans into Greece, who were never admitted into any province but by the temptation of the natives. The common method in such cases is this: as soon as a foreign potentate enters into a province, those who are weaker or disobliged join themselves with him out of emulation and animosity to those who are above them, insomuch that in respect of these inferior lords, no pains is to be omitted that may gain them; and when gained, they will readily and unanimously fall into one mass with the State that is conquered. Only the conqueror is to take special care they grow not too strong, nor be entrusted with too much authority, and then he can easily with his own forces and their assistance keep down the greatness of his neighbours, and make himself absolute arbiter in that province. And he who acts not this part prudently shall quickly lose what he has got, and even whilst he enjoys it be obnoxious to many troubles and inconveniences. The Romans in their new conquests observed this course, they planted their colonies, entertained the inferior lords into their protection without increasing their power; they kept under such as were more potent, and would not suffer any foreign prince to have interest among them. I will set down only Greece for an example. The Etolians and Achaians were protected, the kingdom of the Macedonians was depressed and Antiochus driven out; yet the merits and fidelity of the Achaians and Etolians could never procure them any increase of authority, nor the persuasions and applications of Philip induce the Romans to be his friends till he was overcome, nor the power of Antiochus prevail with them to consent that he should retain any sovereignty in that province: for the Romans acted in that case as all wise princes ought to do who are to have an eye not only upon present but future incommodities, and to redress them with all possible industry; for dangers that are seen afar off are easily prevented, but protracting till they are at hand, the remedies grow unseasonable and the malady incurable. And it falls out in this case, as the physicians say of an hectic fever, that at first it is easily cured and hard to be known, but in process of time, not being observed or resisted in the beginning, it becomes easy to be known but very difficult to be cured. So it is in matters of state, things which are discovered at a distance—which is done only by prudent men—produce little mischief but what is easily averted; but when through ignorance or inadvertency they come to that height that every one discerns them, there is no room for any remedy, and the disease is incurable. The Romans, therefore, foreseeing their troubles afar off, opposed themselves in time, and never swallowed any injury to put off a war, for they knew that war was not avoided but deferred thereby, and commonly with advantage to the enemy; wherefore they chose rather to make war upon Philip, and Antiochus in Greece, than suffer them to invade Italy; and yet at that time there was no necessity of either; they might have avoided them both, but they thought it not fit; for they could never relish the saying that is so frequent in the mouths of our new politicians “to enjoy the present benefit of time,” but preferred the exercise of their courage and wisdom, for time carries all things along with it, and may bring good as well as evil, and ill as well as good. But let us return to France, and examine if what was there done was conformable to what is prescribed here; and to this purpose I shall not speak of Charles VIII but of Louis XII, as of a prince whose conduct and affairs (by reason his possession was longer in Italy) were more conspicuous, and you shall see how contrary he acted in everything that was necessary for the keeping of so different a State. This Louis was invited into Italy by the Venetians, who had an ambition to have got half Lombardy by his coming. I will not condemn the expedition, nor blame the counsels of that King for being desirous of footing in Italy, and having no allies left in that country, but all doors shut against him (upon the ill-treatment which his predecessor Charles had used towards them) he was constrained to take his friends where he could find them, and that resolution would have been lucky enough had he not miscarried in his other administration; for he had no sooner subdued Lombardy but he recovered all the reputation and dignity that was lost by King Charles. Genoa submitted, Florence courted his friendship, the Marquis of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, Bentivoglio, Madam de Furli, the Lords of Faenza, Pesoro, Rimini, Camerino, Piombino; the Lucchesi, Pisani, Sanesi, all of them address themselves to him for his alliance and amity; then the Venetians began to consider and reflect upon their indiscretion, who, to gain two towns in Lombardy, had made the King of France master of two-thirds of all Italy. Let any one now think with how little difficulty the said king might have kept up his reputation in that country if he had observed the rules aforesaid and protected his friends, who being numerous, and yet weak and fearful (some of the Pope, and some of the Venetians), were always under a necessity of standing by him, and with their assistance he might easily have secured himself against any competitor whatever. But he was no sooner in Milan but he began to prevaricate and send supplies to Pope Alexander to put him in possession of Romagna, not considering that thereby he weakened himself and disobliged his friends who had thrown themselves into his arms, and aggrandized the Church by adding to its spiritual authority (which was so formidable before) so great a proportion of temporal; and having committed one error, he was forced to proceed so far as to put a stop to the ambition of Pope Alexander, and hinder his making himself master of Tuscany; the said Louis was forced into Italy again. Nor was it enough for him to have advanced the interest of the Church and deserted his friends, but out of an ardent desire to the kingdom of Naples he shared it with the King of Spain; so that whereas before he was sole umpire in Italy, he now entertained a partner, to whom the ambitious of that province and his own malcontents might repair upon occasion; and whereas the King of that kingdom might have been made his pensioner, he turned out him to put in another that might be able to turn out himself. It is very obvious, and no more than natural, for princes to desire to extend their dominion, and when they attempt nothing but what they are able to achieve they are applauded, at least not upbraided thereby; but when they are unable to compass it, and yet will be doing, then they are condemned, and indeed not unworthily.

If France, then, with its own forces alone, had been able to have enterprised upon Naples, it ought to have been done; but if her own private strength was too weak, it ought not to have been divided: and if the division of Lombardy, to which he consented with the Venetian, was excusable, it was because done to get footing in Italy; but this partition of Naples with the King of Spain is extremely to be condemned, because not pressed or quickened by such necessity as the former. Louis therefore committed five faults in this expedition. He ruined the inferior lords; he augmented the dominion of a neighbour prince; he called in a foreigner as puissant as himself; he neglected to continue there in person; and planted no colonies—all which errors might have been no inconvenience whilst he had lived, had he not been guilty of a sixth, and that was depressing the power of the Venetian. If indeed he had not sided with the Church, nor brought the Spaniards into Italy, it had been but reasonable for him to have taken down the pride of the Venetian; but pursuing his first resolutions, he ought not to have suffered them to be ruined, because whilst the Venetian strength was entire, they would have kept off other people from attempting upon Lombardy, to which the Venetian would never have consented, unless upon condition it might have been delivered to them, and the others would not in probability have forced it from France to have given it to them; and to have contended with them both nobody would have had the courage. If it be urged that King Louis gave up Romagna to the Pope, and the kingdom of Naples to the King of Spain, to evade a war, I answer, as before, that a present mischief is not to be suffered to prevent a war, for the war is not averted but protracted, and will follow with greater disadvantage.

If the King’s faith and engagements to the Pope to undertake this enterprise for him be objected, and that he did it to recompense the dissolution of his marriage, and the cap which at his intercession his Holiness had conferred upon the Legate of Amboise, I refer them for an answer to what I shall say hereafter about the faith of a prince, how far it obliges. So then King Louis lost Lombardy because he did not observe one of those rules which others have followed with success in the conquest of provinces, and in their desire to keep them; nor is it an extraordinary thing, but what happens every day, and not without reason. To this purpose, I remember I was once in discourse with the Cardinal d’Amboise at Nantes, at the time when Valentino (for so Cæsar Borgia, Pope Alexander’s son was commonly called) possessed himself of Romagna. In the heat of our conference, the Cardinal telling me that the Italians were ignorant of the art of war, I replied that the French had as little skill in matters of State; for if they had had the least policy in the world they would never have suffered the Church to have come to that height and elevation. And it has been found since by experience, that the grandeur of the Church and the Spaniard in Italy is derived from France, and that they in requital have been the ruin and expulsion of the French.

From hence a general rule may be deduced, and such a one as seldom or never is subject to exception,—viz., that whoever is the occasion of another’s advancement is the cause of his own diminution; because that advancement is founded either upon the conduct or power of the donor, either of which become suspicious at length to the person preferred.




CHAPTER 4 Why the Kingdom of Darius, usurped by Alexander, did not rebel against his Successors, after Alexander was dead (#ulink_0bd52e29-3526-5f5d-b9b0-0c2bb1c62c46)


The difficulties encountered in the keeping of a new conquest being considered, it may well be admired how it came to pass that Alexander the Great, having in a few years made himself master of Asia, and died as soon as he had done, that State could be kept from rebellion; yet his successors enjoyed it a long time peaceably without any troubles or concussions but what sprung from their own avarice and ambition. I answer that all monarchies of which we have any record were governed after two several manners; either by a prince and his servants whom he vouchsafes out of his mere grace to constitute his ministers, and admits of their assistance in the government of his kingdom; or else by a prince and his barons, who were persons advanced to that quality, not by favour or concession of the prince, but by the ancientness and nobility of their extraction. These barons have their proper jurisdictions and subjects, who own their authority and pay them a natural respect. Those States which are governed by the prince and his servants have their prince more arbitrary and absolute, because his supremacy is acknowledged by everybody; and if another be obeyed, it is only as his minister and substitute, without any affection to the man. Examples of these different governments we may find in our time in the persons of the Grand Signor and the King of France. The whole Turkish monarchy is governed by a single person, the rest are but his servants and slaves; for distinguishing his whole monarchy into provinces and governments (which they call Sangiacchi) he sends when and what officers he thinks fit, and changes them as he pleases. But the King of France is established in the middle, as it were, of several great lords, whose sovereignty having been owned, and families beloved a long time by their subjects, they keep their pre-eminence; nor is it in the king’s power to deprive them without inevitable danger to himself. He, therefore, who considers the one with the other will find the Turkish empire harder to be subdued; but when once conquered more easy to be kept. The reason of the difficulty is, because the usurper cannot be called in by the grandees of the empire, nor hope any assistance from the great officers to facilitate his enterprise, which proceeds from the reasons aforesaid; for being all slaves and under obligation they are not easily corrupted; and if they could, little good was to be expected from them, being unable for the aforesaid reasons to bring them any party: so that whoever invades the Turk must expect to find him entire and united, and is to depend more upon his own proper force than any disorders among them; but having once conquered them, and beaten their army beyond the possibility of a recruit, the danger is at an end; for there is nobody remaining to be afraid of but the family of the emperor, which, being once extinguished, nobody else has any interest with the people, and they are as little to be apprehended after the victory as they were to be relied upon before. But in kingdoms that are governed according to the model of France it happens quite contrary, because having gained some of the barons to your side (and some of them will always be discontented and desirous of change), you may readily enter; they can, as I said before, give you easy admission and contribute to your victory. But to defend and make good what you have got brings a long train of troubles and calamities with it, as well upon your friends as your foes. Nor will it suffice to exterminate the race of the king; forasmuch as other princes will remain, who, upon occasion, will make themselves heads of any commotion, and they being neither to be satisfied nor extinguished, you must of necessity be expelled upon the first insurrection.

Now, if it be considered what was the nature of Darius’s government, it will be found to have been very like the Turks, and therefore Alexander was obliged to fight them, and having conquered them, and Darius dying after the victory, the empire of the Persians remained quietly to Alexander, for the reasons aforesaid; and his successors, had they continued united, might have enjoyed it in peace, for in that whole empire no tumults succeeded but what were raised by themselves. But in kingdoms that are constituted like France it is otherwise, and impossible to possess them in quiet. From hence sprung the many defections of Spain, France and Greece from the Romans, by reason of the many little principalities in those several kingdoms of which, whilst there remained any memory, the Romans enjoyed their possession in a great deal of uncertainty; but when their memory was extinct by power and diuturnity of empire, they grew secure in their possessions, and quarrelling afterwards among themselves, every officer of the Romans was able to bring a party into the field, according to the latitude and extent of his command in the said provinces; and the reason was, because the race of their old princes being extirpate, there was nobody left for them to acknowledge but the Romans. These things, therefore, being considered, it is not to be wondered that Alexander had the good fortune to keep the empire of Asia, whilst the rest, as Pyrrhus and others, found such difficulty to retain what they had got; for it came not to pass from the small or great virtue of the victor, but from the difference and variety of the subject.




CHAPTER 5 How such Cities and Principalities are to be governed who lived under their own Laws before they were subdued (#ulink_660c3f48-6b39-546d-a375-a08656904d74)


When States that are newly conquered have been accustomed to their liberty, and lived under their own laws, to keep them three ways are to be observed: the first is utterly to ruin them; the second, to live personally among them; the third is (contenting yourself with a pension from them) to permit them to enjoy their old privileges and laws, erecting a kind of Council of State, to consist of a few which may have a care of your interest, and keep the people in amity and obedience. And that Council being set up by you, and knowing that it subsists only by your favour and authority, will not omit anything that may propagate and enlarge them. A town that has been anciently free cannot more easily be kept in subjection than by employing its own citizens, as may be seen by the example of the Spartans and Romans. The Spartans had got possession of Athens and Thebes, and settled an oligarchy according to their fancy; and yet they lost them again. The Romans, to keep Capua, Carthage and Numantia, ordered them to be destroyed, and they kept them by that means. Thinking afterwards to preserve, Greece, as the Spartans had done, by allowing them their liberty, and indulging their old laws, they found themselves mistaken; so that they were forced to subvert many cities in that province before they could keep it; and certainly that is the safest way which I know; for whoever conquers a free town and does not demolish it commits a great error, and may expect to be ruined himself; because whenever the citizens are disposed to revolt, they betake themselves of course to that blessed name of liberty, and the laws of their ancestors, which no length of time nor kind usage whatever will be able to eradicate; and let all possible care and provision be made to the contrary, unless they be divided some way or other, or the inhabitants dispersed, the thought of their old privileges will never out of their heads, but upon all occasions they will endeavour to recover them, as Pisa did after it had continued so many years in subjection to the Florentines. But it falls out quite contrary where the cities or provinces have been used to a prince whose race is extirpated and gone; for being on the one side accustomed to obey, and on the other at a loss for their old family, they can never agree to set up another, and will never know how to live freely without; so that they are not easily to be tempted to rebel, and the prince may oblige them with less difficulty, and be secure of them when he hath done. But in a commonwealth their hatred is more inveterate, their revenge more insatiable; nor does the memory of their ancient liberty ever suffer, or ever can suffer them to be quiet; so that the most secure way is either to ruin them quite, or make your residence among them.




CHAPTER 6 Of Principalities acquired by one’s own proper conduct and arms (#ulink_83fd57fa-2a0d-5e20-8665-e74dcfd4aa12)


Let no man think it strange if in speaking of new governments, either by princes or states, I introduce great and eminent examples; forasmuch as men in their actions follow commonly the ways that are beaten, and when they would do any generous thing they propose to themselves some pattern of that nature; nevertheless, being impossible to come up exactly to that, or to acquire that virtue in perfection which you desire to imitate; a wise man ought always to set before him for his example the actions of great men who have excelled in the achievement of some great exploit, to the end that though his virtue and power arrives not at that perfection, it may at least come as near as is possible, and receive some tincture thereby. Like experienced archers, who observing the mark to be at great distance, and knowing the strength of their bow, and how far it will carry, they fix their aim somewhat higher than the mark, not with design to shoot at that height, but that by mounting their arrow to a certain proportion, they may come the nearer to the mark they intend. I say, then, that principalities newly acquired by an upstart prince are more or less difficult to maintain, as he is more or less provident that gains them. And because the happiness of rising from a private person to be a prince presupposes great virtue or fortune, where both of them concur they do much facilitate the conservation of the conquest; yet he who has committed least to fortune has continued the longest. It prevents much trouble likewise, when the prince (having no better residence elsewhere) is constrained to live personally among them. But to speak of such who by their virtue, rather than fortune, have advanced themselves to that dignity, I say that the most renowned and excellent are Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and the like. And though Moses might be reasonably excepted, as being only the executioner of God’s immediate commands, yet he deserves to be mentioned, if it were only for that grace which rendered him capable of communication with God. But if we consider Cyrus, and the rest of the conquerors and founders of monarchies, we shall find them extraordinary; and examining their lives and exploits, they will appear not much different from Moses, who had so incomparable a Master; for by their conversations and successes they do not seem to have received anything from fortune but occasion and opportunity, in introducing what forms of government they pleased; and as without that occasion the greatness of their courage had never been known, so had not they been magnanimous, and taken hold of it, that occasion had happened in vain. It was necessary, therefore, for Moses that the people of Israel should be in captivity in Egypt that to free themselves from bondage they might be disposed to follow him. It was convenient that Romulus should be turned out of Albo, and exposed to the wild beasts when he was young, that he might afterwards be made King of Rome, and founder of that great empire. It was not unnecessary, likewise, that Cyrus should find the Persians mutinying at the tyranny of the Medes, and that the Medes should be grown soft and effeminate with their long peace. Theseus could never have given proof of his virtue and generosity had not the Athenians been in great trouble and confusion. These great advantages made those great persons eminent, and their great wisdom knew how to improve them to the reputation and enlargement of their country. They, then, who become great by the ways of virtue (as the princes aforesaid) do meet with many difficulties before they arrive at their ends, but having compassed them once they easily keep them. The difficulties in the acquisition arise in part from new laws and customs which they are forced to introduce for the establishment and security of their own dominion; and this is to be considered, that there is nothing more difficult to undertake, more uncertain to succeed, and more dangerous to manage, than to make one’s self prince, and prescribe new laws. Because he who innovates in that manner has for his enemies all those who made any advantage by the old laws; and those who expect benefit by the new will be but cool and lukewarm in his defence; which lukewarmness proceeds from a certain awe for their adversaries, who have their old laws on their side, and partly from a natural incredulity in mankind, which gives credit but slowly to any new thing, unless recommended first by the experiment of success. Hence it proceeds, that the first time the adversary has opportunity to make an attempt, he does it with great briskness and vigour; but the defence is so trepid and faint, that for the most part the new prince and his adherents perish together. Wherefore for better discussion of this case it is necessary to inquire whether these innovators do stand upon their own feet, or depend upon other people; that is to say whether in the conduct of their affairs they do make more use of their rhetoric than their arms. In the first case they commonly miscarry, and their designs seldom succeed; but when their expectations are only from themselves, and they have power in their own hands to make themselves obeyed, they run little or no hazard, and do frequently prevail. For further eviction, the Scripture shows us that those of the prophets whose arms were in their hands, and had power to compel, succeeded better in the reformations which they designed; whereas those who came only with exhortation and good language suffered martyrdom and banishment, because (besides the reasons aforesaid) the people are inconstant and susceptible of any new doctrine at first, but not easily brought to retain it; so that things are to be ordered in such manner that when their faith begins to stagger they may be forced to persist. Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus could never have made their laws to have been long observed had they not had power to have compelled it; as in our days it happened to Friar Jerome Savonarola, who ruined himself by his new institutions as soon as the people of Florence began to desert him, for he had no means to confirm them who had been of his opinion, nor to constrain such as dissented. Wherefore such persons meet with great difficulty in their affairs; all their dangers are still by the way, which they can hardly overcome, but by some extraordinary virtue and excellence; nevertheless, when once they have surmounted them, and arrived at any degree of veneration, having supplanted those who envied their advancement, they remain puissant and firm, and honourable and happy. I will add to these great examples another, perhaps not so conspicuous, but one that will bear a proportion and resemblance with the rest, and shall satisfy me for all others of that nature. It is of Hiero of Syracuse, who of a private person was made prince of that city, for which he was beholding to fortune no further than for the occasion, because the Syracusans being under oppression chose him for their captain, in which command he behaved himself so well he deserved to be made their prince, for he was a person of so great virtue and excellence that those who have written of him have given him this character, that even in his private condition he wanted nothing but a kingdom to make him an admirable king. This Hiero subdued the old militia, established a new; renounced the old allies, confederated with others, and having friends and forces of his own, he was able upon such a foundation to erect what fabric he pleased, so that though the acquisition cost him much trouble he maintained it with little.




CHAPTER 7 Of new Principalities acquired by accident and the supplies of other people (#ulink_f5311684-cb9e-512e-b7c8-3233600b466c)


They who from private condition ascend to be princes, and merely by the indulgence of fortune, arrive without much trouble at their dignity, though it costs them dear to maintain it, meet but little difficulty in their passage, being hurried as it were with wings, yet when they come to settle and establish then begins their misery. These kind of persons are such as attain their dignity by bribes, or concession of some other great prince, as it happened to several in Greece, in the cities of Ionia, and upon the Hellespont, where they were invested with that power by Darius for his greater security and glory, and to those emperors who arrived at the empire by the corruption of the soldiers. These persons, I say, subsist wholly upon the pleasure and fortune of those who advanced them, which being two things very valuable and uncertain, they have neither knowledge nor power to continue long in that degree; know not, because, unless he be a man of extraordinary qualities and virtue, it is not reasonable to think he can know how to command other people, who before lived always in a private condition himself; cannot, because they have no forces upon whose friendship and fidelity they can rely. Moreover, States which are suddenly conquered (as all things else in Nature whose rise and increase is so speedy) can have no root or foundation but what will be shaken and supplanted by the first gust of adversity, unless they who have been so suddenly exalted be so wise as to prepare prudently in time for the conservation of what fortune threw so luckily into their lap, and establish afterwards such fundamentals for their duration as others (which I mentioned before) have done in the like cases. About the arrival at this authority either by virtue, or good fortune, I shall instance in two examples that are fresh in our memory; one is Francis Sforza, the other Cæsar Borgia; Sforza, by just means and extraordinary virtue, made himself Duke of Milan, and enjoyed it in great peace, though gained with much trouble. Borgia, on the other side (called commonly Duke of Valentine), got several fair territories by the fortune of his father Pope Alexander, and lost them all after his death, though he used all his industry, and employed all the arts which a wise and brave prince ought to do to fix himself in the sphere where the arms and fortune of other people had placed him: for he, as I said before, who laid not his foundation in time, may yet raise his superstructure, but with great trouble to the architect and great danger to the building. If, therefore, the whole progress of the said Duke be considered, it will be found what solid foundations he had laid for his future dominion, of which progress I think it not superfluous to discourse, because I know not what better precepts to display before a new prince than the example of his actions; and though his own orders and methods did him no good, it was not so much his fault as the malignity of his fortune.

Pope Alexander the Sixth had a desire to make his son Duke Valentine great, but he saw many blocks and impediments in the way, both for the present and future. First, he could not see any way to advance him to any territory that depended not upon the Church; and to those in his gift he was sure the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would never consent; for Faenza and Riminum had already put themselves under the Venetian protection. He was likewise sensible that the forces of Italy, especially those who were capable of assisting him, were in the hands of those who ought to apprehend the greatness of the Pope, as the Ursini, Colonnesi, and their followers, and therefore could not repose any great confidence in them; besides, the laws and alliances of all the States in Italy must of necessity be disturbed before he could make himself master of any part, which was no hard matter to do, finding the Venetians, upon some private interest of their own, inviting the French to another expedition into Italy, which his Holiness was so far from opposing that he promoted it by dissolution of King Louis’s former marriage. Louis therefore passed the Alps by the assistance of the Venetians and Alexander’s consent, and was no sooner in Milan but he sent forces to assist the Pope in his enterprise against Romagna, which was immediately surrendered upon the king’s reputation. Romagna being in this manner reduced by the Duke, and the Colonnesi defeated, being ambitious not only to keep what he had got, but to advance in his conquests, two things obstructed: one was the infidelity of his own army, the other the aversion of the French; for he was jealous of the forces of the Ursini who were in his service, suspected they would fail him in his need, and either hinder his conquest or take it from him when he had done; and the same fears he had of the French. And his jealousy of the Ursini was much increased when, after the expugnation of Faenza, assaulting Bologna, he found them very cold and backward in the attack. And the King’s inclination he discovered when, having possessed himself of the Duchy of Urbin, he invaded Tuscany, and was by him required to desist. Whereupon the Duke resolved to depend no longer upon fortune and foreign assistance, and the first course he took was to weaken the party of the Ursini and Colonni in Rome, which he effected very neatly by debauching such of their adherents as were gentlemen, taking them into his own service, and giving them honourable pensions and governments and commands, according to their respective qualities; so that in a few months their passion for that faction evaporated, and they turned all for the Duke. After this he attended an opportunity of supplanting the Ursini, as he had done the family of the Colonni before, which happened very luckily, and was as luckily improved: for the Ursini, considering too late that the greatness of the Duke and the Church tended to their ruin, held a council at a place called Magione, in Perugia, which occasioned the rebellion of Urbin, the tumults in Romagna, and a thousand dangers to the Duke besides; but though he overcame them all by the assistance of the French, and recovered his reputation, yet he grew weary of his foreign allies, as having nothing further to oblige them, and betook himself to his artifice, which he managed so dexterously that the Ursini reconciled themselves to him by the mediation of Seignor Paulo, with whom for his security he comported so handsomely by presenting with money, rich stuffs, and horses, that being convinced of his integrity, he conducted them to Sinigaglia, and delivered them into the Duke’s hands. Having by this means exterminated the chief of his adversaries, and reduced their friends, the Duke had laid a fair foundation for his greatness, having gained Romagna and the Duchy of Urbin, and insinuated with the people by giving them a gust of their future felicity. And because this part is not unworthy to be known for imitation sake, I will not pass it in silence. When the Duke had possessed himself of Romagna, finding it had been governed by poor and inferior lords, who had rather robbed than corrected their subjects, and given them more occasion of discord than unity, insomuch as that province was full of robberies, riots, and all manner of insolencies; to reduce them to unanimity and subjection to monarchy, he thought it necessary to provide them a good governor, and thereupon he conferred that charge upon Remiro d’Orco, with absolute power, though he was a cruel and passionate man. Orco was not long before he had settled it in peace, with no small reputation to himself. Afterwards, the Duke, apprehending so large a power might grow odious to the people, he erected a court of judicature in the middle of the province, in which every city had its advocate, and an excellent person was appointed to preside. And because he discovered that his past severity had created him many enemies, to remove that ill opinion, and recover the affections of the people, he had a mind to show that, if any cruelty had been exercised, it proceeded not from him but from the arrogance of his minister; and for their further confirmation, he caused the said governor to be apprehended, and his head chopped off one morning in the marketplace at Cesena, with a wooden dagger on one side of him and a bloody knife on the other; the ferocity of which spectacle not only appeased but amazed the people for a while. But resuming our discourse, I say, the Duke finding himself powerful enough, and secure against present danger, being himself as strong as he desired, and his neighbours in a manner reduced to an incapacity of hurting him, being willing to go on with his conquests, there remaining nothing but a jealousy of France, and not without cause, for he knew that king had found his error at last, and would be sure to obstruct him. Hereupon he began to look abroad for new allies, and to hesitate and stagger towards France, as appeared when the French army advanced into the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards, who had besieged Cajeta. His great design was to secure himself against the French, and he had doubtless done it if Alexander had lived. These were his provisions against the dangers that were imminent; but those that were remote were more doubtful and uncertain. The first thing he feared was lest the next Pope should be his enemy, and reassume all that Alexander had given him, to prevent which he proposed four several ways. The first was by destroying the whole line of those lords whom he had dispossessed, that his Holiness might have no occasion to restore them. The second was to cajole the nobility in Rome, and draw them over to his party, that thereby he might put an awe and restraint upon the Pope. The third was, if possible, to make the College his friends. The fourth was to make himself so strong before the death of his father as to be able to stand upon his own legs and repel the first violence that should be practised against him. Three of these four expedients he had tried before Alexander died, and was in a fair way for the fourth; all the disseized lords which came into his clutches he put to death, and left few of them remaining; he had insinuated with the nobility of Rome, and got a great party in the College of Cardinals; and as to his own corroboration, he had designed to make himself master of Tuscany, had got possession of Perugia and Piombino already, and taken Pisa into his protection. And having now farther regard of the French (who were beaten out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniard, and both of them reduced to necessity of seeking his amity), he leaped bluntly into Pisa, after which Lucca and Sienna submitted without much trouble, partly in hatred to the Florentines, and partly for fear; and the, Florentines were grown desperate and without any hopes of relief; so that had these things happened before, as they did the same year in which Alexander died, doubtless he had gained so much strength and reputation that he would have stood firm by himself upon the basis of his own power and conduct, without depending upon fortune or any foreign supplies. But his father died five years after his son had taken up arms, and left him nothing solid and in certainty, but Romagna only, and the rest were in nubibus, infested with two formidable armies, and himself mortally sick. This Duke was a man of that magnanimity and prudence, understood so well which way men were to be wheedled, or destroyed, and such were the foundations that he had laid in a short time, that had he not had those two great armies upon his back, and a fierce distemper upon his body, he had overcome all difficulties and brought his designs to perfection. That the foundations which he had laid were plausible appeared by the patience of his subjects in Romagna, who held out for him a complete month, though they knew he was at death’s door, and unlikely ever to come out of Rome, to which place, though the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Ursini returned, seeing there was no likelihood of his recovery, yet they could not gain any of his party, nor debauch them to their side. It is possible he was not able to put who he pleased into the Pontifical chair, yet he had power enough to keep any man out who he thought was his enemy; but had it been his fortune to have been well when his father Alexander died, all things had succeeded to his mind. He told me himself, about the time that Julius XI was created, that he had considered well the accidents that might befall him upon the death of his father, and provided against them all, only he did not imagine that at his death he should be so near it himself. Upon serious examination, therefore, of the whole conduct of Duke Valentine, I see nothing to be reprehended; it seems rather proper to me to propose him, as I have done, as an example for the imitation of all such as by the favour of fortune, or the supplies of other princes, have got into the saddle; for his mind being so large, and his intentions so high, he could not do otherwise, and nothing could have opposed the greatness and wisdom of his designs but his own infirmity and the death of his father. He, therefore, who thinks it necessary in the minority of his dominion to secure himself against his enemies, to gain himself friends; to overcome, whether by force or by fraud; to make himself beloved or feared by his people; to be followed and reverenced by his soldiers; to destroy and exterminate such as would do him injury; to repeal and suppress old laws, and introduce new; to be severe, grateful, magnanimous, liberal, cashier and disband such of his army as were unfaithful, and put new in their places; manage himself so in his alliances with kings and princes that all of them should be either obliged to requite him or afraid to offend him: he, I say, cannot find a fresher or better model than the actions of this prince. If in anything he is to be condemned, it is in suffering the election of Julius XI, which was much to his prejudice; for though, as is said before, he might be unable to make the Pope as he pleased, yet it was in his power to have put any one by, and he ought never to have consented to the election of any of the cardinals whom he had formerly offended, or who, after their promotion, were like to be jealous of him; for men are as mischievous for fear as for hated. Those cardinals which he had disobliged were, among others, the cardinals of St. Peter ad Vincula, Collonno St. George, and Ascanius. The rest, if any of them were advanced to the Papacy, might well be afraid of him, except the Spanish cardinals and the cardinal of Roan; the Spaniards by reason of their obligations and alliance, and the other by reason of his interest in the kingdom of France. Wherefore, above all things, the Duke should have made a Spanish cardinal Pope; and if that could not have been done, he should rather have consented to the election of Roan than St. Peter ad Vincula; for it is weakness to believe that among great persons new obligations can obliterate old injuries and disgusts. So that in the election of this Julius XI Duke Valentine committed an error that was the cause of his utter destruction.




CHAPTER 8 Of such as have arrived at their Dominion by wicked and unjustifiable means (#ulink_833d55d9-ac72-5ed8-9e08-d790484523b9)


Now because there are two ways from a private person to become a prince, which ways are not altogether to be attributed either to fortune or management, I think it not convenient to pretermit them, though of one of them I may speak more largely where occasion is offered to treat more particularly of Republics. One of the ways is, when one is advanced to the sovereignty by any illegal nefarious means; the other, when a citizen by the favour and partiality of his fellow-citizens is made prince of his country. I shall speak of the first in this chapter, and justify what I say by two examples, one ancient, the other modern, without entering further into the merits of the cause, as judging them sufficient for any man who is necessitated to follow them. Agathocles, the Sicilian, not only from a private, but from a vile and abject, condition was made king of Syracuse; and being but the son of a potter, he continued the dissoluteness of his life through all the degrees of his fortune; nevertheless, his vices were accompanied with such courage and activity that he applied himself to the wars, by which, and his great industry, he came at length to the pretor of Syracuse. Being settled in that dignity, and having concluded to make himself prince, and hold that by violence, without obligation to anybody, which was conferred upon him by consent, he settled an intelligence with Amilcar the Carthaginian, who was then at the head of an army in Sicily, and calling the people and Senate of Syracuse together one morning, as if he had been to consult them in some matter of importance to the State, upon a signal appointed he caused all his soldiers to kill all the senators and the most wealthy of the people; after whose death he usurped and possessed the dominion of that city without any obstruction; and though afterwards he lost two great battles to the Carthaginians, and at length was besieged, yet he was not only able to defend that city, but leaving part of his forces for the security of that, with the rest he transported into Africa, and ordered things so that in a short time he relieved Syracuse, and reduced the Carthaginians into such extreme necessity that they were glad to make peace with him, and contenting themselves with Africa, leave Sicily to Agathocles. He then who examines the exploits and conduct of Agathocles will find little or nothing that may be attributed to fortune, seeing he rose not, as is said before, by the favour of any man, but by the steps and gradations of war, with a thousand difficulties and dangers having gotten that government, which he maintained afterwards with as many noble achievements. Nevertheless it cannot be called virtue in him to kill his fellow-citizens, betray his friends, to be without faith, without pity, or religion; these are ways may get a man empire, but no glory or reputation. Yet if the wisdom of Agathocles be considered, his dexterity in encountering and overcoming of dangers, his courage in supporting and surmounting his misfortunes, I do not see why he should be held inferior to the best captains of his time. But his unbounded cruelty and barbarous inhumanity, added to a million of other vices, will not permit that he be numbered amongst the most excellent men. So then, that which he performed cannot justly be attributed to either fortune or virtue; for he did all himself, without either the one or the other. In our days, under the Papacy of Alexander VI, Oliverotto da Fermo being left young many years since by his parents, was brought up by his uncle by the mother’s side, called John Fogliani, and in his youth listed a soldier under Paulo Vitelli, that having improved himself by his discipline, he might be capable of some eminent command. Paulo being dead, he served under Vitellezzo, his brother, and in a short time by the acuteness of his parts and the briskness of his courage, became one of the best officers in his army. But thinking it beneath him to continue in any man’s service, he conspired with some of his fellow-citizens of Fermo (to whom the servitude of their country was more agreeable than its liberty) by the help of Vitellesco to seize upon Fermo. In order to which, he wrote a letter to his uncle John Fogliano, importing that, having been absent many years, he had thoughts of visiting him and Fermo, and taking some little diversion in the place where he was born, and because the design of his service had been only the gaining of honour, that his fellow-citizens might see his time had not been ill-spent, he desired admission for a hundred horse of his friends and his equipage, and begged of him that he would take care they might be honourably received, which would redound not only to his honour, but his uncle’s, who had had the bringing him up. John was not wanting in any office to his nephew, and having caused him to be nobly received, he lodged him in his own house, where he continued some days, preparing in the meantime what was necessary to the execution of his wicked design. He made a great entertainment, to which he invited John Fogliani and all the chief citizens in the town. About the end of the treatment when they were entertaining one another, as is usual at such times, Oliverotto very subtilly promoted certain grave discourses about the greatness of Pope Alexander and Cæsar his son, and of their designs. John and the rest replying freely to what was said, Oliverotto smiled, and told them those were points to be argued more privately, and thereupon removing into a chamber, his uncle and the rest of his fellow-citizens followed. They were scarce sat down before soldiers (which were concealed about the room) came forth and killed all of them, and the uncle among the rest. After the murder was committed, Oliverotto mounted on horseback, rode about, and rummaged the whole town, having besieged the chief magistrate in his palace; so that for fear all people submitted, and he established a government of which he made himself head. Having put such to death as were discontented, and in any capacity of doing him hurt, he fortified himself with new laws, both military and civil, insomuch as in a year’s time he had not only fixed himself in Fermo, but was become terrible to all that were about him; and he would have been as hard as Agathocles to be supplanted, had he not suffered himself to have been circumvented by Cæsar Borgia, when at Singalia (as aforesaid) he took the Ursini and Vitelli; where also he himself was taken a year after his parricide was committed, and strangled with his master Vitellozzo, from whom he had learned all his good qualities and evil.

It may seem wonderful to some people how it should come to pass that Agathocles, and such as he, after so many treacheries and acts of inhumanity, should live quietly in their own country so long, defend themselves so well against foreign enemies, and none of their subjects conspire against them at home, seeing several others, by reason of their cruelty, have not been able, even in times of peace as well as war, to defend their government. I conceive it fell out according as their cruelty was well or ill applied; I say well applied (if that word may be added to an ill action), and it may be called so when committed but once, and that of necessity for one’s own preservation, but never repeated afterwards, and even then converted as much as possible to the benefit of the subjects. Ill applied are such cruelties as are but few in the beginning, but in time do rather multiply than decrease. Those who are guilty of the first do receive assistance sometimes both from God and man, and Agathocles is an instance. But the others cannot possibly subsist long. From whence it is to be observed, that he who usurps the government of any State is to execute and put in practice all the cruelties which he thinks material at once, that he may have no occasion to renew them often, but that by his discontinuance he may mollify the people, and by his benefits bring them over to his side. He who does otherwise, whether for fear or ill counsel, is obliged to be always ready with his knife in his hand; for he can never repose any confidence in his subjects, whilst they, by reason of his fresh and continued inhumanities, cannot be secure against him. So then injuries are to be committed all at once, that the last being the less, the distaste may be likewise the less; but benefits should be distilled by drops, that the relish may be the greater. Above all, a prince is so to behave himself towards his subjects that neither good fortune nor bad should be able to alter him; for being once assaulted with adversity, you have no time to do mischief; and the good which you do, does you no good, being looked upon as forced, and so no thanks to be due for it.




CHAPTER 9 Of Civil Principality (#ulink_c03c80a4-5578-5977-8df5-228871286ca3)


I shall speak now of the other way, when a principal citizen, not by wicked contrivance or intolerable violence, is made sovereign of his country, which may be called a civil principality, and is not to be attained by either virtue or fortune alone, but by a lucky sort of craft; this man, I say, arrives at the government by the favour of the people or nobility, for in all cities the meaner and the better sort of citizens are of different humours, and it proceeds from hence that the common people are not willing to be commanded and oppressed by the great ones, and the great ones are not to be satisfied without it. From this diversity of appetite one of these three effects do arise—principality, liberty, or licentiousness. Principality is caused either by the people or the great ones, as either the one or the other has occasion; the great ones, finding themselves unable to resist the popular torrent, do many times unanimously confer their whole authority upon one person, and create him prince, that under his protection they may be quiet and secure. The people, on the other side, when overpowered by their adversaries, do the same thing, transmitting their power to a single person, who is made king for their better defence. He who arrives at the sovereignty by the assistance of the great ones preserves it with more difficulty than he who is advanced by the people, because he has about him many of his old associates, who, thinking themselves his equals, are not to be directed and managed as he would have them. But he that is preferred by the people stands alone without equals, and has nobody, or very few, about him but what are ready to obey; moreover, the grandees are hardly to be satisfied without injury to others, which is otherwise with the people, because their designs are more reasonable than the designs of the great ones, which are fixed upon commanding and oppressing altogether, whilst the people endeavour only to defend and secure themselves. Moreover, where the people are adverse the prince can never be safe, by reason of their numbers; whereas the great ones are but few, and by consequence not so dangerous. The worst that a prince can expect from an injured and incensed people is to be deserted; but, if the great ones be provoked, he is not only to fear abandoning, but conspiracy and banding against him; for the greater sort being more provident and cunning, they look out in time to their own safety, and make their interest with the person who they hope will overcome. Besides, the prince is obliged to live always with one and the same people; but with the grandees he is under no such obligation, for he may create and degrade, advance and remove them as he pleases. But for the better explication of this part, I say, that these great men are to be considered two ways especially; that is, whether in the manner of their administration they do wholly follow the fortune and interest of the prince, or whether they do otherwise. Those who devote themselves entirely to his business, and are not rapacious, are to be valued and preferred. Those who are more remiss, and will not stick to their prince, do it commonly upon two motives, either out of laziness or fear (and in those cases they may be employed, especially if they be wise and of good counsel, because, if affairs prosper, thou gainest honour thereby; if they miscarry, thou needest not to fear them) or upon ambition and design, and that is a token that their thoughts are more intent upon their own advantage than thine. Of these a prince ought always to have a more than ordinary care, and order them as if they were enemies professed; for in his distress they will be sure to set him forwards, and do what they can to destroy him. He, therefore, who comes to be prince by the favour and suffrage of the people is obliged to keep them his friends, which (their desire being nothing but freedom from oppression) may be easily done. But he that is preferred by the interest of the nobles against the minds of the commons, is, above all things, to endeavour to ingratiate with the people, which will be as the other if he undertakes their protection; and men receiving good offices, where they expected ill, are endeared by the surprise, and become better affected to their benefactor than perhaps they would have been had he been made prince by their immediate favour. There are many ways of insinuating with the people of which no certain rule can be given, because they vary according to the diversity of the subject, and therefore I shall pass them at this time, concluding with this assertion—that it is necessary, above all things, that a prince preserves the affections of his people, otherwise, in any exigence, he has no refuge or remedy. Nabides, Prince of the Spartans, sustained all Greece and a victorious army of the Romans, and defended the government and country against them all; and to do that great action it was sufficient for him to secure himself against the machinations of a few; whereas, if the people had been his enemy, that would not have done it. Let no man impugn my opinion with that old saying, “He that builds upon the people builds upon the sand.” That is true, indeed, when a citizen of private condition relies upon the people, and persuades himself that when the magistrate or his adversary goes about to oppress him they will bring him off, in which case many precedents may be produced, and particularly the Gracchi in Rome, and Georgio Scali in Florence. But if the prince that builds upon them knows how to command, and be a man of courage, not dejected in adversity, nor deficient in his other preparations, but keeps up the spirits of his people by his own valour and conduct, he shall never be deserted by them, nor find his foundations laid in a wrong place.





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